The fact that a person has a legal obligation to do X provides him with a moral reason to do X only if he has a moral duty to obey the law — that is, a political obligation. We may admit, on this view, that people receive benefits from a cooperative practice, and even net benefits, but we should also notice that they might have benefited more from the establishment of a different practice.
Natural duties are also universal in scope; they are owed to all members of a class defined in terms of possession of some feature, such as sentience or rationality. For more recent examples, see Simmonspp. A Plurality of Principles?
Whether their efforts have been successful remains a matter of debate. Walker holds that one may have an obligation of gratitude not only to other persons but also to institutions, including the state or polity; but critics such as Simmons disagreepp.
Finally, it is not clear that consent is really the key to political obligation in these theories. Absent their good-faith sacrifice of the liberty to act on their private judgments regarding what justice requires, the free-rider would likely be unable to act as he does Wellmanpp.
There seems to be a consensus, however, that the most sophisticated attempts to provide a utilitarian grounding for political obligation, such as those of Rolf Sartoriuschaps. Or, if coerced or immoral owing-obligations are genuine but always defeated or trumped by moral-requirement-obligations, one might wonder why we should posit their separate existence at all.
A second response to the problem Romans 13 posed was to distinguish disobedience from resistance. For Hume, it seems, the obligation to obey the law derives not from consent or contract but from the straightforward utility of a system of laws that enables people to pursue their interests peacefully and conveniently.
But it also points to the need for natural duty theorists to elaborate upon their so far brief discussions of the contribution that a legitimate international legal order makes to the legitimacy of domestic legal orders.
As Wolff and other philosophical anarchists have argued, the fact that many people feel a sense of identity with and obligation to their countries does not mean that they really have such an obligation; nor need one be a philosophical anarchist to share this conclusion.
First, it presupposes the existence of divinity of some sort; and second, the commands of the divine being s are not always clear. But does such an obligation exist or obtain in any general or widespread sense?
A Theory of Political Obligation, Oxford: In contrast to Hobbes, Kant looks upon the coercive force of the law not as a limitation on freedom but as the means of securing and extending it.
The Duty to Obey the Law: And the attacks have certainly continued e. Under the pressure of those disputes, however, another theory of political obligation became increasingly prominent, as Protestants came to rely on the belief that political authority derives from the consent of the governed Skinner, vol.
Note that a general moral duty to obey the law is consistent with variation in the legal obligations different subjects bear. By the same reasoning, whether I should obey or disobey the law is a matter to be settled by considering which will do more good, not by determining whether I have an obligation to obey.
If there is a political obligation, therefore, it does not follow directly from the existence of the kind of nonexcludable goods that states provide.
On the other hand, those who believe that political obligation is fundamentally a problem of showing that those who live in a polity governed by the rule of law do indeed have a general obligation to obey its laws, rather than a bundle of obligations to obey its laws severally, in piecemeal fashion e.
The value of this distinction is that it allows one to hold that a person may be subject to a legal obligation even though she has no political obligation to obey the laws of the regime in power.
This obligation is owed to the others who cooperate in the enterprise, for cooperation is what makes it possible for any individual to enjoy the benefits of the practice.
One possibility is that doing so is necessary to render intelligible the response of the promisee when the coerced promisor reneges on her promise; we can understand why the promisee feels betrayed even if we do not think he is justified in feeling that way.Dec 10, · In this now-classic work, he clearly and systematically formulates what others thought impossible_a principle of fairness that specifies a set of conditions which grounds existing political obligations and bridges the gap between the abstract accounts of political principles and the actual beliefs of political actors/5(5).
Women and Political Representation in Canada: Equality, Fairness, and Capabilities I.
Introduction Social equality is the concept in which all individuals possess the same fundamental basic liberties, opportunities, moral value/respect, and social benefits. In The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation (), Klosko ably defended the view that the principle of fairness can account for at least some political obligations.
A standard objection to the application of this principle is that it is paternalistic to presume the. The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation* George Klosko Though such important political philosophers as John Rawls and H.
A. Hart have discussed the principle of fairness (or fair play), it has received I attempt to show that the obligations the principle generates are widespread.
The Paperback of the The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation by George Klosko at Barnes & Noble. FREE Shipping on $ or more! Specialists - Summer Reading.
This book offers an account of (moral) political obligations based on a principle of fairness. Unlike other fairness accounts, Klosko's grows out of the purported fact that provisions of security (national defense, law and order, and public health issues) are necessary and are necessarily public.Download